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THE COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY IN HARPER V.

POWAY
I. INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse v.
Frederick,l bringing the case better known as "Bong Hits 4
Jesus" into widespread public attention. "Bong Hits" featured a
familiar narrative-a rebellious student alleges persecution by
his high school principal after a minor incident-which, when
added to a relatively frivolous fact pattern and a headlinegrabbing nickname, placed the case in the spotlight.
Beneath the public hype,2 however, lies a jurisprudential
disappointment. In accepting Bong Hits, and refusing to accept
a case where compelling school interests were in conflict with
high-value student speech, the Court missed an opportunity to
clarify important, unresolved dimensions of schoolhouse speech
law. Instead of granting certiorari in Bong Hits, the Court
should have decided a more important schoolhouse speech case
last term: Harper v. Poway Unified School District.3
What Harper lacked in a sexy nickname, it more than made
up for in a compelling presentation of legal issues that school
officials across the country need to have resolved. How much
discretion do school officials have to restrict speech when they

1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
2. Coverage in the Washington Post called Bong Hits "[t]he most important
student free-speech conflict to reach the Supreme Court since the height of the
Vietnam War." Robert Barnes, Justices to Hear Landmark Free-Speech Case, WASH.
POST, Mar. 13, 2007, at A3.
3. 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). Specifically, on March 5, 2007, the Court granted
certiorari in Harper, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded with
instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. Justice Breyer dissented without opinion.
The mootness problem in Harper arose because Petitioner Harper had graduated from
Poway High School. Suggestion of Mootness at 1, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,
127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (No. 06-595). The Court could have avoided this mootness
problem, however, by granting Harper's younger sister's motion to intervene, as she is
currently a student at Poway High. Harper, 127 S. Ct at 1484 (denying motion to
intervene); see also Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. 445 F.3d 1166, 1173 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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fear substantial disruption to the school environment,
especially post-Columbine? Is it ever possible for a student's
words and writings alone to "invade the rights of others?" What
should school officials do when presented with high-value
speech that conflicts with their interest in school safety?
In Part II we discuss Bong Hits, briefly outlining the factual
background and summarizing the Supreme Court's decision. In
Part III we argue that the Court's decision to accept Bong Hits
was flawed because (1) the case presented a simplistic question
pitting low-value speech against a high government interest
and (2) the Court failed to provide any meaningful guidance on
how to resolve closer cases. In Part IV we explain why Harper
would have been a better case for the Court to decide, and offer
a suggested resolution to a similar case if and when it comes
before the Court in the future.

II. HOW A CASE CALLED "BONG HITS" MADE IT TO THE SUPREME
COURT

A. The Simple Facts of Bong Hits
On January 24, 2002, en route to the winter games and
followed by television crews, the Olympic Torch Relay made its
way through Juneau, Alaska.4 To Joseph Frederick, a senior
attending Juneau-Douglas High School ("JDHS"), the television
crews were particularly appealing.5 JDHS released its students
to witness and participate in the event, though they were
supervised by JDHS officials and teachers.6
As the relay and camera crews passed in front of JDHS,
Frederick joined7 a crowd of both students and non-studentsS
observing the event and, along with several friends, unfurled a
14-foot banner reading "BONG HITS 4 JESUS."9 Frederick has
since stated that he displayed the banner "to be meaningless
and funny, in order to get on television,"10 and that the

4. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
5. Joint Appendix at 27-28, 66, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278).
6. !d.; Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278).
7. Frederick arrived at the event directly from home. Brief for the Petitioner,
supra note 6, at 5; Brief for the Respondent at 2, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278).
8. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622; Brieffor the Respondent, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
10. Linda Greenhouse, Free-Speech Case Divides Bush and Religious Right, N.Y.
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message "really did not have a meaning ... it was a parody and
could be subjectively interpreted to mean whatever anyone
want[ed] it to mean."ll
Regardless of the banner's intended meaning, if any, JDHS
Principal Deborah Morse did not take kindly to its display.12
Upon seeing the banner, Morse approached Frederick and
demanded that it be taken down.13 Frederick initially resisted,
asking about his First Amendment rights and questioning
whether he was on school grounds.l4 Morse then took the
banner down and instructed Frederick to report to her office,
where she suspended him for ten days.15 Morse justified the
sanction on her belief that the banner was in violation of a
Juneau School Board policy prohibiting expression that
advocates the use of illegal substances.16
Frederick administratively appealed his suspension to the
School Superintendent.17 Though limiting the term to time
served (eight days), the Superintendent upheld the
suspension.lS Frederick next appealed to the Board of
Education, which also upheld the suspension.19 Having
exhausted his administrative remedies, Frederick brought suit
against Morse and the Juneau School Board under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights and
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.20
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska
granted summary judgment in favor of Morse and the Juneau
School Board ("School Board"), holding that they were entitled

TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at A22.
11. Joe Frederick, Joe's Story, STRIKE THE ROOT, Nov. 17, 2003,
http://www. strike-the-root.com/3/frederick/frederick 1. html.
12. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
13. Id.
14. Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 24-25; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6,
at 5.
15. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. The suspension was subsequently reduced to eight
days on administrative appeal. I d. at 2623.
16. Id. at 2623 (stating that School Board Policy No. 5520 prohibits "any
assembly or public expression that ... advocates the use of substances that are illegal
to minors ... "); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 6; Brief for the Respondent,
supra note 7, at 3-4.
17. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
18. Id.
19. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 7, at 4.
20. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
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to qualified immunity and that they had not violated
Frederick's First Amendment rights.21 In finding no First
Amendment violation, the district court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,22
which, in the district court's view, "stated that it is the province
of the [School] Board to determine what manner of speech ...
is inappropriate."23
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Frederick's speech should instead be analyzed under the
Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.24 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with
the district court's application of Fraser, noting that "[o]ur case
differs from Fraser in that Frederick's speech was not sexual [],
and did not disrupt a school assembly."25 Because Morse and
the School Board had not shown that the banner risked
substantial disruption to the educational environment, which
would have justified the suspension under Tinker, the court
held that Frederick's free speech rights had been violated.26
The Ninth Circuit further held that Morse and the School

21. Id.

22. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Fraser, a high school student delivered a speech laced
with sexual innuendo to a captive audience of 600 fellow students. The speech
distracted several students in the audience and resulted in some yelling and graphic
gestures. The school district reacted by disciplining the student for his use of "indecent"
and "obscene" language. Id. at 677-79. In the resulting lawsuit, the student argued
successfully in the Ninth Circuit that the district's language standards were overly
vague and that his speech did not create a substantial disruption to the educational
environment. Id. at 679-80. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse." Id. at 683. The Court reasoned that sexual
innuendo before a captive audience of adolescents was something a school reasonably
could restrict. Id. at 685.
23. Frederick v. Morse, No. J02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D.
Alaska May 29, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006). 8ee generally Tinker
v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S 503 (1969). In Tinker, a small group of
high school students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to
school. When the school district heard of the plan, it adopted a policy prohibiting the
wearing of all armbands. The students wore the armbands, were suspended from
school, and filed suit claiming violation of their First Amendment free speech rights.
Id. at 504. The Supreme Court ruled for the students. They retained their First
Amendment speech rights within the schoolhouse walls, because there was "no
evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work
or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." Id. at
508.
25. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1119.
26. Id. at 1123.
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Board were not entitled to qualified immunity.27

B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
Rev8rsing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
"schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their
care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use."28 The Court's holding did not
result from an application of any of its prior school speech
cases. At the outset, the Court determined that Hazelwood
School District u. Kuhlmeier29 was not controlling because "no
one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner bore the
school's imprimatur."30 The opinion, written by Chief Justice
Roberts, next discussed Fraser 31 and acknowledged that "[t]he
mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear,"
leaving it open to multiple interpretations.32 Fraser could be
read to focus on the sexual content of the speech, or it could be
read to stand for the broader principle that "school boards have
the authority to determine what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate."33 However,
the Court determined that it "need not resolve this debate to
decide this case."34
Instead of applying Tinker, its only remaining school speech
case, the Court resolved Bong Hits by identifying a new
category of speech that may be prohibited by the schools
without any showing of a risk of substantial disruption: speech

27. ld. at 1125.
28. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
29. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, high school students writing for the school
newspaper had several prospective articles censored by the principal. The school
newspaper was published and taught for credit as the "Journalism II" class. The
students claimed that their First Amendment rights to free speech in school were being
violated. The principal believed that the articles, which were written about family
divorce and student pregnancy issues, were inappropriate because they risked
identifying members of the student body and thus showed a failure to master
journalism principles taught in "Journalism II." Id. at 262-65. The Supreme Court held
that the principal could reasonably restrict the speech because it was curricular,
stating that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." Id. at 273.
30. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627.
31. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
32. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626.
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id.
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encouraging illegal drug use.35 In coming to this conclusion,
the Court focused on the strong government interest in
deterring drug use by schoolchildren.36 This interest,
considered in light of the "special characteristics of the school
environment,"37 "allow[s] schools to restrict student expression
that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use."38
In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito (joined by Justice
Kennedy) effectively limited the scope of the Court's holding,
making it clear that he joined the five justice majority opinion
on the understanding that it would not support the restriction
of speech which "[could] plausibly be interpreted as
commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on
issues such as the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing
marijuana for medicinal use."39 Justice Alito sought to
harmonize the Court's opinion with school speech precedent by
explaining his view that "illegal drug use presents a grave and
in many ways unique threat to the physical safety of students,"
thus aligning the Court's ruling with Tinker's emphasis on
avoiding violence and material disruption to the schools.40
Justice Alito also made it clear that he did not endorse any
reading of Fraser that gave school boards authority to censor
student speech contrary to their self-defined educational
missions.41 In particular, he expressed concern that "the
'educational mission' argument would give public school
authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed."42
Justice Thomas concurred separately, providing a detailed
review of pre- Tinker public education cases in support of his
conclusion that "the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public
schools."43
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and dissented in

35.
36.
37.
503, 506
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

ld. at 2622.
ld. at 2628.
ld. at 2629 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist .. 393 U.S.
(1969)).
ld.
ld. at 2636 (Alita, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ld. at 2638.
ld. at 2637.
ld.
ld. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the reasoning, expressing his view that the damage elements of
the case should have been disposed of based on Morse and the
School Board's qualified immunity, and that injunctive relief
should have been denied because Frederick's suspension was
justified for reasons other than the banner display. 44
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented on the
grounds that Frederick's banner "neither violate[d] a
permissible rule nor expressly advocate[d] conduct that is
illegal and harmful to students."45
III. A CRITICAL READING OF BONG HITS
There are two major problems with the Court's decision to
grant certiorari in Bong Hits. First, as discussed in Part III.A,
the very fact that there are substantial arguments about
whether this case was a schoolhouse speech case at all
warrants serious doubt as to the Court's propriety in granting
certiorari. Second, as discussed in Part III.B, Bong Hits
presented an easy case in which a high government interest
was weighed against low-value student speech. This dichotomy
is too similar to Fraser, and accordingly Bong Hits could not be
expected to help answer the more difficult question of how a
case involving both high governmental interests and high-value
speech should be resolved. Despite these concerns, the
questionable wisdom of granting certiorari in Bong Hits might
have been ameliorated had the Court provided helpful
doctrinal guidance on how to resolve future, more difficult
school speech cases. As discussed in Part III.C, the Court not
only failed to provide meaningful guidance, it actually made
this area of the law less clear.
A. Bong Hits Shares None of the Special Characteristics that
Warrant Reduced Student Speech Rights

The first major problem with Bong Hits is that it's arguably
not about school speech. The Court majority asserted that the
Olympic torch relay was "school-sanctioned and schoolsupervised,"46 while Frederick pointed out that his banner was
not within school classrooms, hallways, or even official

44. Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2622.
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grounds, but was instead on a public thoroughfare, during a
public event.47 Given the ambiguity, should the school speech
precedents even apply?
Our aim is not to rehash the factual dispute, but to look at
the philosophical justification for why courts distinguish
schoolhouse speech cases from other realms of speech. The
courts have consistently justified students' reduced speech
rights by looking to three "special characteristics of the school
environment."48 Because Bong Hits satisfies none of these
special characteristics, it is ultimately ill-suited to the line of
schoolhouse speech cases it has joined.
The first of these special characteristics is that schools have
a substantial interest in protecting the physical safety of their
students, well above the interest of the government in
protecting the general public. 49 In Tinker, for example, the
Court held that administrators had the authority to protect the
educational environment from speech leading to substantial
disruption or interference with the "rights of other students to
be secure and let alone."50 Since Tinker, courts have uniformly
held that speech threatening physical disruption can be
suppressed. 51
The second special characteristic is the immaturity of the
audience: schools can protect captive adolescents from offensive
speech, including sexual innuendo. This principle is
exemplified in Fraser, where school officials sanctioned a
student for a speech laced with sexual innuendo during a
mandatory school assembly.52 The Court emphasized that
captive audiences of immature high school students do not
have to be forced to listen to "sexually explicit, indecent, or

47. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 7, at 4, 8.
48. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 39:3 U.S. fi03, 506 (1969). These
special characteristics havE~ also warranted different Fourth Amendment rights for
students in schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995):
New ,Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, :336 (1985).
49. See Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ .. 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir.
1966) ("The proper operation of public school systems is one of the highest and most
fundamental responsibilities of the state. The School authorities in the instant case
had a legitimate and substantial interest in the orderly conduct of the school and a
duty to protect such substantial interests in the school's operation.'').
50. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
51. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Denno v.
Sch. Bd. ofVolusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000); West v. Derby Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (lOth Cir. 2000).
52. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (Hl86).
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lewd speech" in the name of the First Amendment. 53
The third special characteristic of schools is their need to
control their curriculum. In Hazelwood, the Court held that
schools do not have to sponsor certain student speech in the
curricular setting.54 This ensures that schools can avoid
association
with
any
potentially-controversial
student
position. 55
Bong Hits exhibits none of these special characteristics.
Morse admitted that Frederick's banner in no way threatened
disruption or the rights of others to be secure in the
educational environment,56 so Tinker was inapplicable.57 The
Ninth Circuit held that there was no sexual or otherwise
plainly offensive speech involved, so Fraser was inapplicable.58
Hazelwood was similarly unavailable, since "Frederick's prodrug banner was not sponsored or endorsed by the school, nor
was it part of the curriculum, nor did it take place as part of an
official school activity."59
In Bong Hits, the Court several times recited the law's
"special characteristics" mantra,60 yet still chose to apply-and
modify-schoolhouse speech law around a situation that did
not trigger any of the doctrine's fundamental assumptions. The
Court lacked all of the philosophical justifications that have
historically been used to rationalize reduced speech rights in
school. Because there was no identified educational need for
the suppression of a student's First Amendment rights, the
Court should have used some other philosophical justification
for analyzing Bong Hits in the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood line.

53. Id. at 684; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-75
(1988).
54. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
55. Id.
56. Brief of Appellant at 5, Frederick v. Morse, 439 F. 3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (No.
o::l-:35701).
57. Frederick v. Morse, 4::l9 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). In his concurrence,
Justice Alito attempted to argue that speech that promotes illegal drug use is similar
enough to physical disruption that it can be regulated under Tinher. See supra Part
II. B. Although Justice Ali to's attempt to bring Bong Hits in line with precedent is
welcome, his argument equating drug speech with physical disruption is a stretch.
58. Frederick. 4:39 F.3d at 1119.
59. Id.
60. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625, 2629 (2007).
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B. Bong Hits Presented an Easy Case, Balancing Significant

Government Interests Against Low- Value Student Speech
The second major problem with the Court's decision to
grant cert in Bong Hits is that the case, like Fraser, presented
yet another fact pattern in which a significant government
interest was weighed against low-value student speech. To put
it simply, Bong Hits was too easy a case for the Court to decide,
since the governmental interest almost always wins in this fact
pattern.61 It would be much more helpful to educators and
attorneys for the Court to accept a case of high-value speech
that runs in conflict with other fundamental characteristics of
the school setting (e.g., high-value political speech that risks
substantial disruption of the educational environment or
invasion of the rights of other students).
In Bong Hits, all parties agreed that the speech in question
was of little value. Principal Morse argued that it "advertise[ d)
or promote[d] use of illegal drugs."62 Frederick responded only
that it was "meaningless and funny."63 The dissent danced
around the meaning of the phrase "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" and
described it as "curious," "ambiguous," "nonsense," "ridiculous,"
"obscure," "silly," "quixotic," and "stupid";64 it never labeled the
message important, relevant, or worth any serious
consideration. There was nothing of social or political value in
Frederick's message.
The respect courts assign to the speaker also bleeds into the
value of the speech itself. Frederick was not exactly a model
student at JDHS. Earlier that same year, he was disciplined
for refusing to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance.65 While
such challenges to authority might be respected when coming
from a speaker defending sincerely held beliefs, Frederick does
not appear to be such a speaker.66 The dissenting justices in
Bong Hits could not come up with a better motive for

61. See supra note 51.
62. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 64.
66. In fact, Frederick has claimed that he refused to stand for the pledge in
response to an unfriendly exchange with a school Vice Principal the previous day.
Frederick, supra note 11. Frederick later described his saga as "a story of a high school
senior who refused to bow down in submission before an authority." Barnes, supra note
2.
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Frederick's actions during the torch relay than that "he just
wanted to get on television."67 Even when attempting to invoke
the First Amendment in his defense, Frederick's self-avowed
motive is trivial: "We thought we had a free speech right to
display a humorous saying, and that's all we were doing."68
Frederick's appearance as a student who repeatedly challenged
school officials to, at best, make trivial First Amendment points
he did not particularly care about could not have helped the
Court's perception that his speech was of little value, and likely
made it more probable that the Court would find for Morse.
The governmental interest at issue in Bong Hits was
significant. Decisions have long recognized that there is an
"important-indeed,
perhaps
compelling"
governmental
interest in deterring drug use by school children.69 The
majority cited a number of studies, all demonstrating that "the
[drug] problem remains serious today."70 Finally, the Court
observed that Congress and "[t]housands of school boards
across the country" have implemented policies and programs
aimed at discouraging drug use by schoolchildren.71
Bong Hits' low-value speech/high government interest
dichotomy is quite similar to Fraser, where the "recognized []
interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and
offensive spoken language"72 easily outweighed Fraser's right
to express an "elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor" to a captive audience of high school students.73 The
Court repeatedly emphasized that Fraser's speech was lowvalue through frequent sobering comments about the schools'
role in teaching "fundamental values of habits and manners of
civility."74 The Court also cast the speaker in a negative light
by describing how teachers had warned him not to deliver the
speech, and generally disparaged his decision to deliver a
speech with sexual innuendo to adolescents. 75

67.
68.
69.
646, 661

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649.
Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 28.
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
(1995)).
Id.
Id.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
!d. at 678.
Id. at 681.
!d. at 678.

136

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2008

Bong Hits and Fraser are essentially the opposite of Tinker,
where protecting high-value political speech outweighed an
insignificant government interest. In Tinker, a small group of
students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands to school. 76 The students were very serious and
chose a respectful, non-confrontational approach. 77 This
political speech was balanced against the school's illegitimate
interest in "avoid[ing] the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."78 Unsurprisingly,
the Court held that school officials had violated the students'
First Amendment rights, and could not suspend students for "a
silent passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any
disorder or disturbance."79
The Court's categorical approach impedes establishment of
a functional body of schoolhouse speech law. It is just too easy
to hold that significant government interests allow schools to
suppress low-value speech. The lack of a serious countervailing
principle means that the Court can avoid the challenging
issues that educators actually face, like what to do when a
serious, controversial speaker risks sparking a physical
disruption. As a conservative advocacy organization said in its
amicus brief, "It would be regrettable if the Court were to
resolve the important questions of constitutional law at issue
here in the context of a jokester's prank, rather than a
student's bearing of a serious message."SO
What educators and lawyers need is for the Court to weigh
in upon the following situation: a respectful, respected student
attempts to speak on important, political issues, yet is silenced
by
administrators
fearing
substantial
disruption
or
interference with the rights of other students. Even if the
Court were to uphold the student's punishment, as in Bong
Hits, the legal value to school administrators and their lawyers
would be dramatically different. It strains credulity to believe
that Justice Thomas would have written the same Bong Hits
concurrence-that students lack all free speech rights in

76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:1. 504 (1969).
77. Id. at 508.
78. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (quoting Tinher, 393 U.S. at
509).
79. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
80. Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278).
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schoolsSl-if the speech in question was religious or politically
conservative (e.g., "Mfirmative Action is shameful").
C. The Court Failed to Use Bong Hits as an Opportunity to

Clarify Schoolhouse Speech Jurisprudence
Like Justice Breyer, we "cannot find much guidance in [the
Court's] decision."S2 Having decided to take this questionable
case, the Court could have at least provided meaningful
guidance as to how future, closer cases of student speech
suppression in the public schools should be resolved.
To be sure, Bong Hits did answer some questions in what
the Second Circuit recently called "the unsettled waters of free
speech rights in public schools."83 All members of the Court
agreed that, even if Frederick's speech was protected, Morse
would have been entitled to qualified immunity.84 The Court
also resolved at least one lingering question about Fraser: the
decision "should not be read to encompass any speech that
could fit under some definition of 'offensive."'S5
But this minor clarification pales in comparison to the
critical question the Court decided it "need not resolve":
whether Fraser is limited to speech that is sexual in nature, or
whether it stands for the broader principle that "school boards
have the authority to determine what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate."86 Not only
has this debate divided the circuits,87 it was the very question
that divided the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Bong
Hits.88 While Justice Alita's rejection of this broader reading of

81. Morse. 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "the
Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools").
82. Id. at 2640 (Bwyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Breyer suggested that the Court rule on qualified immunity grounds and thus
avoid the underlying schoolhouse speech question. Id. at 2638.
83. Guiles ex rei. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006).
84. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
85. Id. at 2629.
86. Id. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(19R6)).
87. Compare Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Fraser
focuses upon the sexual nature of the offensiveness in the in-school speech that can be
punished ... .").with Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F. 3d 465, 470 (6th Cir.
2000) ("The Supreme Court has held that the school board has the authority to
determine 'what manner of speech in the classroom or in school is inappropriate."'
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:1 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986))).
88. See supra Part I I.A.
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Fraser89 is helpful, and may well guide its interpretation in the
future, the Court's failure to produce a majority opinion on this
important point is lamentable.
Compounding the problem of not resolving this key debate
over Fraser's proper interpretation, the Court also chose not to
apply its only other potentially relevant school speech
precedent, Tinker.90 Instead, to quote Justice Stevens, the
Court "invent[ed] out of whole cloth a special First Amendment
rule permitting the censorship of any student speech that
mentions drugs, at least so long as someone could perceive that
speech to contain a latent pro-drug message."91 Carving out a
third exception to Tinker (after Fraser and Hazelwood) for
illegal drug promotion provides little future guidance to school
administrators and their attorneys. As Justice Thomas aptly
put it, "[The Court's] jurisprudence now says that students
have a right to speak in schools except when they don't."92
Creating this third exception also leaves important
questions about how to apply Tinker's test unanswered. For
example, when is a forecasted disruption substantial enough to
warrant suppressing student speech? What did Tinker mean
when it said that speech that interferes with "the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone" may be
suppressed?93 Interestingly, the Bong Hits opinion appears to
have actually increased the uncertainty surrounding this
"rights of others" prong. Unlike in Fraser and Hazelwood,
neither the majority nor any of the concurring opinions
included the rights of others language in their descriptions of
Tinker's holding.94 This omission is puzzling in light of the
lower courts' clear recognition of the rights of others prong as
an independent element under Tinker,95 and calls into question
future attempts to rely on it in the Tinker analysis.
We have serious doubts that Bong Hits was worth Supreme
Court review. It failed to fall under any of the traditional

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ali to, .J ., concurring).
Id. at 2626 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(J2. !d. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).

i-\9.

90.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622-43.
9fi. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)
(Ali to ..J.. writing for the court) ("The precise scope of Tinker's 'interference with the
rights of others' languagP is unclear.").
9:!.

94.
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special circumstances that warrant reduced speech rights in
school, presented an easy case m which significant
governmental interests were weighed against low-value
student speech, and is of marginal utility to educators. Tyler
Chase Harper, however, did not have a frivolous message and
was not labeled a drug dealer by the school. His respectful yet
challenging speech would have presented the Court with a
more difficult and meaningful case of balancing First
Amendment rights with school safety.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED HARPER V. POWAY
INSTEAD OF BONG HITS

As we will see, Harper touches upon very serious public
issues of gay rights, religious expression, and student speech
inside school walls. In Part IV.A, we review Harper's facts. In
Part IV.B, we discuss why Harper, unlike Bong Hits, would
have required the Court to address and resolve some of the
most difficult and important issues in school speech law. In
Part IV.C, we suggest a way for the Court to resolve such a
difficult high government interest, high-value speech case.

A. The Simple Facts of Harper v. Poway
Poway High School ("Poway") had a history of conflict and
disruption surrounding sexual orientation issues.96 During the
2003 "Day of Silence," an annual student-led event raising
awareness of discrimination against homosexuals, "volatile
behavior," including an altercation that required Principal
Scott Fisher to physically separate students, broke out among
students.97 A week later, an unexpected "Straight Pride Day,"
involving "inflammatory," anti-homosexual messages on handprinted t-shirts, resulted in an altercation, personal conflicts,
and several suspensions.98 Principal Fisher, fearing future
physical conflicts, met with student leaders and attempted to

96. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. 445 F. 3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006).
97. Excerpts of Record at 149, 152, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 44ii F.:Jd
1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-57037).
98. !d. at 152, 1.57. These larger incidents aside, disruption around sexual
orientation issues was a daily occurrence at Poway. Several homosexual students
recently successfully sued Poway for failing to provide a safe environment and
permitting numerous forms of anti-homosexual harassment. Harper, 445 F. 3d at 1172,
n.6.
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"problem-solve" the tension.99
On the 2004 Day of Silence, Tyler Chase Harper, a
sophomore at Poway and a devout Christian, 100 decided to
express his opposition to the Day of Silence.lOl Harper believed
that homosexual behavior was "destructive to humankind ...
immoral, damaging to the practitioners and to human society
in general,"102 and that the school was "advocating the
homosexual lifestyle."103 He wore a t-shirt with "I WILL NOT
ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" taped on the front,
and "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL" taped on the back,
with a biblical citation.104 Apparently, no one noticed.105 The
next day he changed the t-shirt message to read "BE
ASHAMED OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS
CONDEMNED" on the front, and "HOMSEXUALITY IS
SHAMEFUL" on the back, again followed by a biblical
citation.106
With this new message, Harper got a rise out of his fellow
students, and was "confronted by a group of students on
campus" that very morning, resulting in a "tense verbal
conversation.''107 Soon afterward, his teacher noticed that
Harper's t-shirt had "caused a disruption" in the classroom.108
The teacher thought that Harper's t-shirt "created a negative
and hostile working environment for others," and sent Harper
to the front office.109
Harper may not have realized how seriously administrators
would take his t-shirt. Just two hours earlier, a "very upset"
man claiming to be a parent had called the school and
threatened them for "condoning" the Day of Silence.llO The
caller said that he and others had "had it" and "would be doing
something about it."111 He "said he was coming to campus that

99. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 152.
100. ld. at 5.
101. ld. at 6.
102. ld. at 5.
103. ld. at 185.
104. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 116(i. 1171 (8th Cir. 2006).
105. ld.
106. Id.
107. ld. at 1171.
108. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 156.
108. Id. at 157.
llO. ld. at lfi9.
111. ld.; Harper, 445 F.3d at 1173, n. 7.

1]

THE COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY

141

day," causing administrators to fear for the safety of the
school.112 The administrators called to get their assigned
deputy sheriff on campus as soon as possible.ll ;) When Harper
arrived in the office they thought his situation might be related
and were concerned that his t-shirt might incite violence.114
Several school officials spoke with Harper. The school's
deputy sheriff briefly met with Harper to document the t-shirt
and assess the potential for violence.l15 The deputy sheriff
warned the school officials that, in his opinion, Harper's t-shirt
"could lead to disruption between the students."l16 Assistant
Principal Edward Giles chatted with Harper about their shared
faith-they had previously attended the same church for some
years-and empathized that school employees also had to be
careful about expressing disruptive beliefs in a work
environment.117 He suggested that Harper make the message
more "non-confrontational," and encouraged him to become an
officer of the Bible Club. US
Principal Fisher spoke with Harper about the physical
dangers that could result from Harper's t-shirt, and how
inflammatory Harper's particular choice of language was to
other students, but Harper would not change his t-shirt or
remove the tape.119 Principal Fisher had Harper remain in the
front office, gave him credit for attendance, and did not
suspend him or place anything in his disciplinary file.120
Harper did not display the t-shirt message again, and Poway
did not further discipline Harper.121
Soon thereafter, Harper filed a complaint alleging that
Poway violated his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.l22 He requested preliminary and permanent
mJunctions prohibiting the school from "violating [his]
constitutional rights by selectively banning religious expression

112. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 1 fi4.
Jl:l. !d. at 159.
114. !d. at 154.
115. Irl. at 165.
1lfi. !d. at 166.
117. !d. at 160, 162; Harper, 445 F. 3d at ll7:1.
11~. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 162.
119. !d. at 149.
120. Jd. at 1fi0.
121. llarper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., :H5 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (S.D. Cal.
2004).
122. /d.
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in school," declaratory judgment against Poway's policies and
actions, nominal damages, punitive damages, and civil
penalties.12::l
In November 2004, the district court denied Harper's
motion for preliminary injunction largely on Tinker's
substantial disruption grounds.124 The court held that Harper
"failed to demonstrate he [would] succeed on the merits of his
claims."125 Additionally, because Poway still needed to protect
school safety and the rights of other students, the court held
that "the balance of hardships [did] not tip sharply in
[Harper's] favor."l26
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the preliminary injunction.127 The Ninth Circuit
agreed that Harper did not demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits of his free speech claim because Harper's speech
intruded upon the rights of other students to be secure and let
alone.128 Harper petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.129 The Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth
Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to
dismiss the appeal as moot because Harper had already
graduated from Poway.130

B. The Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Resolve the
Conflict Between High- Value Speech and Compelling
Government Interests
Harper presented a remarkable opportunity for the Court to
improve and clarify existing schoolhouse speech law. There is
no doubt that Harper belongs in the school speech line of cases.
Harper's t-shirt provoked a tense confrontation in school
hallways and created a disruptive working environment in the
classroom.l :31
123. Excerpts of Hecord. supra note 97, at 17.
124. Harper, :)41) F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
125. Id. at 1119.
126. Id. at 1122.
127. Harper. 445 F.:>d at 1171.
128. Id. at 1175.
129. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
130. Id. (stating that the district court had alrt>ady entered final judgment
dismissing Harper's claims as moot); Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 3. at 1
(stating that the District Court had dismissed Harper's equitable claims as moot
because Harper had graduated from high school and thus no longer had standing).
131. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., :345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, ll20 (S.D. Cal.
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Harper thus triggers two of the 'special circumstances' that
schoolhouse speech law recognizes as justifications for reduced
speech in schools. Administrators, teachers, and others
believed that Harper's speech would result in substantial
disruption to the educational environment, as in Tinker.1:12
They also believed that Harper's t-shirt presented offensive
speech to a captive audience (the classroom), as in Fraser.l:33
While Justice Alito called Bong Hits "at the far reaches" of
schoolhouse speech regulation, 1:H Harper falls clearly under
multiple prongs of traditional doctrine.
Harper also placed high-value speech from a respected
speaker in conflict with important government interests.
Administrators thought that Harper's t-shirt could provoke
disruption, but they also believed that Harper was genuine in
his belief and respectful of school officials.135 This was part of
Principal Fisher's motivation in declining to discipline Harper
through suspension or notation in his record.l36 He did not
have any other disciplinary record or questionable activities.I:37
Thus, it is probable that the Court would have described him
and his message with respect. The Court would have been
presented with important government interests already
recognized as worthy of restricting speech in schools: physical
disruption, interference with the rights of others, and offensive
speech in front of captive adolescents.
The combination of high-value speech and compelling
governmental interests would be much more difficult to resolve
and correspondingly should produce an opinion more valuable
to educators. Harper places uniformly recognized values-free
speech and children's safety-in direct conflict.138 This
situation confuses conventional political lines and would make
predicting the Court's decision difficult.

2004); ExcPrpts of Record, supra note 97, at 156.
132. See Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 149-50, 156-57, 162, 166.
133. See id. at 149; Harper, 445 F. 3d at 117H.
134. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007).
1:35. Harper, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1100-01.
136. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 50. In fact, later on school
administrators expressed their sympathy for Harper, who may have been pressured
into his speech by conservative religious organizations looking for a test case.
Statemlmt.s of Poway School Officials, Speech at Stanford Law School (March 15, 2007).
I :37. Statements of Poway School Officials, supra note 136.
1:38. Recognized values to everyone except .Justice Thomas, perhaps. Morse, 127 S.
Ct. at 26:10 (Thomas. J., concurring).
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Conservatives on the Court, for example, may be more
interested in promoting religious speech and politicallyconservative messages that challenge perceived school
endorsement of homosexuality. Yet they may also be more
prone to public safety arguments and 'command and control'
methods increasingly popular in schools, which would clamp
down on speech like Harper's. On this side, the Court would
hear data on the modern dangers facing schools, including a
perception of increased school shootings and educators' new
tools of violence prediction. '"Reading, writing and arithmetic'
must now make room for phrases like 'threat assessment
approach' and 'school-wide lock down."'l:39 The Court would
also hear about how educators are placed in the unenviable
position of trying to identify dangerous students and pinpoint
when they must step in to prevent harm.l40 These arguments
may encourage conservative Justices to find Poway officials
justified in protecting the school environment.
The liberals on the Court would also face ideological
conflicts. Some Justices may agree with Judge Reinhardt of the
Ninth Circuit that Harper's speech was threatening and
demeaning to homosexual students.141 The Court would look to
data on the challenges facing young homosexual students,
including social isolation, academic underachievement, and
high dropout rates.142 On the other hand, the liberal Justices
would also be more likely to welcome greater speech rights in
the school environment. They may be persuaded by advocates
arguing that schools have given in to post-Columbine fears of
harmless speech sparking a school shooting. "[S]ince the fall of
1999, as schools reopened for the first post-Littleton school
year, [the ACLU has] been seeing even more measures that are
turning schools into fortresses and students into prisoners. All
across the country, ACLU offices have been receiving
complaints from students and parents in record-setting
numbers."148
139. Richard C. Demerle, Note, The New Scylla and Charybdis: Student Speech us.
Student Safety After Columbine, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L .•J. 428, 429 (20(ll).
140. See Mary Ellen O'Toole, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective,
http :1/www .fbi. gov/pu blica tions/ school/school2. pdf.
141. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006).
142. ld.
143. Nadine Strossen, Keeping the Constitution Inside the Schoolhouse GateStudents' Rights Thirty Years After Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 462 (2000).
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Each member of the Court would be faced with a classic
dilemma: encourage the substantive speech itself at the risk of
a disagreeable long-term legal rule, or set a legal rule that
discourages the sympathetic speaker yet broadens the door for
future advocacy? Regardless of the outcome, resolving this kind
of conflict with Harper's unconventional facts wou'd have been
of higher value than Bong Hits' summary affirmation of school
officials' authority to participate in the War on Drugs.144 In the
future, the Court should accept a more challenging case, giving
educators facing difficult situationsl45 guidance on how
conflicting interests in the educational environment must be
resolved.

C. A Proposal for the Resolution of the Difficult Issues Harper
Presents in the Future
We have argued that the Court should have decided Harper
v. Poway on its merits and used the case to provide guidance as
to how to balance strong government interests against highvalue speech. We would be remiss, however, in describing the
ways in which Harper was a better choice without providing
our own form of guidance, namely, a suggestion for a way to
resolve Harper.
A nonpolitical legal solution to the high-value speech/high
government interest dilemma is suggested in Justice Breyer's
Bong Hits partial concurrence and dissent. Breyer notes that
the "surrounding context and manner" of Frederick's speech
also seemed important to Morse's decision to remove the
banner.146 "To say that school officials might reasonably
prohibit students during school-related events from unfurling
14-foot banners (with any kind of irrelevant or inappropriate
message) designed to attract attention from television cameras
seems unlikely to undermine basic First Amendment
principles."l47 We propose extending this context and manner
argument not just for low-value speech, but as a tiebreaker for
high-value speech that also implicates an important
government interest like public safety.
144. Especially given the reduced Fourth Amendment and due process rights
students are entitled to in schools. See supra note 49.
145. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 ("School principals have a difficult
job, and a vitally important one.").
146. !d. at 26:31' (Breyer, .J., concurring).
147. !d.
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A manner rationale is based in the Court's Fraser decision,
which explicitly noted that "[n]othing in the Constitution
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of
expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions."148
Lower courts have also taken note of manner-type themes: the
district court in Harper, for example, observed, "[T]here is
nothing in the record to suggest [Harper] would not be free to
proselytize any religious view or any other viewpoint in a
manner that does not violate neutral and valid school
policies."149
Indeed, other evidence suggests that Poway's decision to
suppress Harper's speech was largely influenced by Harper's
manner of speaking. Administrators believed that derogatory
phrases taped on his t-shirt would give classmates the short,
provocative aspect of Harper's message without his underlying
devout, respectful beliefs.150 They also believed that having a
message on a t-shirt was an improper manner of speaking
because it forced other students to sit and view it in the
classroom, distracting them from their rights to be secure and
let alone, and risking disruption of the primary educational
environment.151
In a 2007 speech, school officials described how they found
a way for Harper to communicate his message in a more
controlled, effective manner.152 During the next year's Day of
Silence, administrators gave Harper an opportunity to speak to
interested students.15:3 They set up a small platform for him in
the school's usual space for students to gather during lunch.154
The situation avoided short t-shirt messages, giving students
an opportunity to hear the full extent of Harper's beliefs. The
location was also important: being outside of the classroom,
students could opt-in to Harper's talk during time not reserved
for schoolwork.155 Administrators were on hand to ensure that
Harper did not incite his fellow students and that violence did
148. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (emphasis
added).
149. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1122 (S.D. Cal.
2004) (emphasis added).
150. Excerpts of Record, supra note 97, at 162 (Declaration of Edward L. Giles).
151. I d. at 153, 156 (Declarations of Lynell Antrim and David Lee LeMaster).
152. Statements of Poway School Officials, supra note 1:i6.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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not erupt.l56 Harper spoke for ten to fifteen minutes without
incident.157
Poway's manner-based approach here benefited most, but
not all parties. Several students heard Harper's perspective,
teachers worked in an uninterrupted environment, and
administrators avoided their nightmare of physical violence.
Perhaps the only person that came out worse-off was Harper
himself. When he was done, Harper looked visibly disappointed
that others did not care enough to engage with his viewpoint,
either in agreement or disagreement.l58
Using manner as a tiebreaker helps avoid encouraging
First Amendment martyrs. When administrators clamp down
on speech, the resulting outrage and claims of suppression lead
to lawsuits and a sense of martyrdom in the name of securing
Constitutional rights. Thoughtful school administrators know
that their actions can backfire and actually encourage more
speech, risking further disruption. We suggest that in close
calls, students should be allowed to speak in conformance to
guidelines on appropriate methods of communication, allowing
all sides to achieve their goals. By providing guidelines for how
students may present their viewpoints, schools can encourage
high-value student speech while still protecting compelling
government interest in student safety.

V. CONCLUSION
Bong Hits was certainly not "[t]he most important student
free-speech conflict to reach the Supreme Court since the
height of the Vietnam War."159 While Bong Hits had an
interesting set of facts and appealed to a broad audience, it did
nothing to clarify or resolve important issues relating to
student speech restrictions. The opinion will become an
asterisk to traditional schoolhouse speech law, carving out a
small exception for low-value speech promoting illegal drug
use. In contrast, Harper presented a novel issue of student
speech restriction: what happens when high-value student
speech is in conflict with a compelling government interest?

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Statements of Poway School Officials, supra note 136.
Barnes, supra note 2.
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In the future, we hope that the Court will accept a case
similar to Harper. When it does, we suggest that the Court look
to the practice of Poway educators and use the manner and
context of the speech as a tiebreaker. The practical solution of
Poway school administrators led to a careful, appropriate, and
we believe Constitutional means of balancing speech and
safety.
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